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Why do African banks lend so little?

06.06.2011Andrianova Svetlana

A recent research project at the University of Leicester funded by the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK sheds new light on the reasons why banks in Africa are excessively liquid.

Our work shows how the failure of credit markets in Africa to function efficiently might combine with institutional failures to inhibit bank lending. Credit markets can malfunction when there is a shortage of information about borrowers, either information about their propensity deliberately to default on a loan (moral hazard) or information about the true return of the investment they intend to undertake and their likely ability to repay (adverse selection). Both of these problems will discourage banks from lending to domestic customers. Rule of law can mitigate these problems. If loan contracts are easier to enforce, then borrowers are less likely to default deliberately, or to choose to engage in investments they know to be highly risky. A legal system that is even-handed, consistent and free from corruption will make it easier for banks to enforce loan contracts.

Our study shows that a certain minimum standard of contract enforcement will ensure that the market does not malfunction, however substantial the underlying moral hazard and adverse selection problems are. Below this minimum standard, the expected liquidation value of defaulted loans is so low as to discourage banks from lending.  The degree to which this happens depends on both the extent of institutional failure and the proportion of borrowers who are bad default risks, either because they are opportunistic or because they have bad projects or bad luck.
 
We also provide empirical evidence on the magnitude of these effects by analyzing data on default rates and asset structure for individual banks in different African countries. Specifically, we show that there is a threshold standard of regulatory quality that will effectively protect banks from any level of moral hazard or adverse selection. This minimum standard is roughly that of the average country around the world (in the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators) – that is, a country which has quite a high standard for Africa. In countries which fall below this standard – that is, most countries in Africa – an increasing rate of loan defaults is associated with increasing liquidity. In the worst cases, with almost no effective regulation and a high propensity to default, banks will channel most of their deposits into foreign assets.

Our evidence confirms that many banks suffer from a shortage of information about the creditworthiness of many of their customers. As a result, local savings are not channelled into local investment, and the money leaves the local economy.

A companion study of banks operating in the WAEMU over 2000-2005 by Demetriades and Fielding (2011) – a summary of which can be found in Table 1 - reveals that banks which are older, or owned partly by foreign banks, are less sensitive to a high rate of default in the country, and more likely to shift assets abroad or take on government debt when the default rate rises. Younger banks without any foreign or government ownership are more sensitive. One possible ex planation for this difference is that younger local banks have relatively little information about their customers, or have relatively few long-standing relationships that dissuade customers from defaulting when it is convenient to do so. Similar problems arise in banks which do a relatively large amount of business away from the main financial centre in the country. Banks committed to lending to provincial customers are more sensitive to changes in national default rates. This might be because information about customers is more expensive to acquire in the provinces, or because regulatory quality tends to be weaker there. Interestingly, there is no strong association between the sensitivity to loan default and the overall profitability of a bank. Banks which lend less to local households and businesses, and acquire foreign or government assets instead, are not significantly less profitable. The alternatives are typically much more liquid, but their average rate of return is apparently not that much lower than conventional lending. This may be part of the problem.

Table 1. Average effect of a one percentage point increase in the national default rate on a bank's loans-to-assets ratio (in percentage points).

completely domestically owned


completely foreign owned

age

20 provincial branches

no provincial branches

20 provincial branches

no provincial branches

1 year

-7.5 pct. pts.

-4.7 pct. pts.

-6.4 pct. pts.

-3.6 pct. pts.

10 years

-6.5 pct. pts.

-3.7 pct. pts.

-5.4 pct. pts.

-2.6 pct. pts.

20 years

-5.5 pct. pts.

-2.7 pct. pts.

-4.4 pct. pts.

-1.6 pct. pts.

30 years

-4.4 pct. pts.

-1.6 pct. pts.

-3.3 pct. pts.

insignificant

40 years

-3.4 pct. pts.

insignificant

-2.3 pct. pts.

insignificant

Many new banks have been created in the last twenty years, but this has not led to significantly more competition in the loans market, because the younger banks lack the market information to make much money out of lending locally.

Aside from encouraging improvements in institutional quality, one way to widen access to bank loans might be through creating or increasing the number of credit information bureaux.


By Svetlana Andrianova, Reader (Associate Professor) in Economics, University of Leicester, United Kingdom,
with Badi H. Baltagi, Distinguished Professor of Economics, Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University, USA, and Professor of Economics, University of Leicester, United Kingdom
Panicos Demetriades, Professor of Financial Economics, University of Leicester, United Kingdom
David Fielding, Professor of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand



References
Andrianova, S., B. Baltagi, P.O. Demetriades and D. Fielding. 2011. “Why Do African Banks Lend So Little?”, University of Leicester Working Paper No. 11/19.
Demetriades, P.O. and D. Fielding. 2011. “Information, Institutions and Banking Sector Development in West Africa, Economic Inquiry, Early View  

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