Africa Finance Forum Blog

Currently the posts are filtered by: Legal & Regulatory Environment
Reset this filter to see all posts.

Better Regulations Can Spur Agent Banking in WAEMU

11.04.2018Corinne Riquet, Financial Sector Specialist, CGAP

This blog was originally published on the CGAP website.

The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) has taken significant steps toward financial inclusion in recent years. Mobile money has driven much of this progress under the aegis of regulations that make it possible for mobile network operators to offer e-money services and expand their agent networks and the reach of their services. However, WAEMU’s regulations make it difficult for banks and microfinance institutions to expand their own agent networks and contribute fully to financial inclusion. While the number of mobile money accounts and agents in the region roughly doubled between 2014 and 2017 (to 36.4 million and 183,000, respectively), banks and microfinance institutions have lagged behind.

Even in the age of mobile money, these traditional financial institutions have an important role to play in expanding low-income customers’ access to financial services. For example, as Will Cook points out in his recent CGAP blog post, bank accounts in Kenya once again outnumber mobile money accounts – by 30 percent. Alongside partnerships with mobile money providers, a rise in agent banking has contributed to this increase. In 2016, 17 commercial banks developed agent banking and contracted over 40,000 agents. The Central Bank reported that agent banking saw 55.8 million transactions in the first quarter of that year, compared to 10.3 million in the same period the year before. Kenya’s regulators enabled this kind of growth by adopting a risk-based approach when defining the country’s agency banking regulatory framework in 2010 and integrating provisions for consumer protection.

What will it take for WAEMU regulators to similarly unlock the potential of banks and microfinance institutions to drive financial inclusion for the region’s 50 million people living in poverty?

[In November 2017] CGAP published a regulatory diagnostic of digital financial services in Côte d’Ivoire, which has the same agent regulations as the other WAEMU member countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo). We found that WAEMU recognizes three types of agents and that the regulations surrounding them contribute to disparities among different types of institutions (banks, nonbank e-money issuers, microfinance institutions, etc.):

  • E-money agents. E-money agents may conduct marketing activities and supply services related to e-money, including account enrollment, cash-in and cash-out and payments. Current regulations provide for a two-tier system of primary agents and subagents (or “distributors” and “subdistributors,” as they are called in the regulation), who act under the responsibility of the e-money issuer. Retailers and other registered businesses, microfinance institutions, the post office and other nonbank financial institutions are permitted to serve as primary agents. These agents may outsource to other registered businesses who act as subagents. These rules have allowed mobile network operators to deploy large agent networks in the eight WAEMU countries.

  • Rapid money transfer agents. Another regulation enables banks, nonbank financial institutions and microfinance institutions to provide over-the-counter transactions, or “rapid fund transfers,” through retail agents called “subagents.” Permitted transactions are limited to real-time transfers that are performed over the counter at an authorized provider or agent and do not involve any bank or e-money account of either the sender or recipient. These providers act under the responsibility of a financial institution and are not allowed to collect funds for deposits for any purpose other than over-the-counter transfers (unless they are microfinance institutions). The best-known of these over-the-counter providers is WARI, which has large networks of subagents in most of the WAEMU countries.

  • Banking agents. Beyond e-money and over-the-counter transfers, the scope for using agents is unclear. The rules that do exist are highly restrictive for banks, and there is no explicit framework for microfinance institutions. Banks are authorized by the banking law and a 2010 instruction from BCEAO (the common central bank for the WAEMU region) to use agents called Intermédiaires en Opérations de Banque (IOBs). An IOB acts under a mandate assigned by a bank, which may include opening accounts and taking deposits. Each IOB is required to obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance, on the advice of BCEAO. It is also subject to fit-and-proper standards – a financial guarantee whose level depends on the nature of the mandate and regular reporting requirements. The IOB model did not arise for the sake of financial inclusion but rather, as a business niche for intermediaries operating within the traditional banking sector comparable to an insurance agency. As a result, since the introduction of these rules in 2010, BCEAO has approved and registered only six IOBs, and two are authorized to just collect deposits.

While regulations on e-money agents have greatly expanded the reach of mobile money, those surrounding agent banking appear too restrictive for the banks and are nonexistent for the microfinance sector. This creates a competitive disadvantage for traditional financial services providers to make use of digital channels in expanding their reach and relevance. Uniform, or at least harmonized, rules across the board for e-money, over-the-counter transactions and banking agents would be a big step in the right direction. Any new framework should provide a comprehensive and proportionate set of risk-based rules on due diligence, supervision, internal control and subagents. And special consideration should be given to replacing or revising IOB rules to support a more flexible agent banking approach.

More harmonized rules around agent networks would ensure a level playing field for all financial services providers to seize the opportunities presented by digitization to reduce cost, increase scale and expand financial inclusion.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

About the Author

Corinne Riquet is an independent microfinance consultant and has worked in several African countries since 2001. She has advised a range of clients, especially MFIs and funders on organizational audit practices, business plan development, appraisals, designing financial service projects in rural areas, and evaluating and defining national microfinance strategies. Since 2002, she has been a resource person for CGAP's MFI Capacity Building Program in Francophone Africa (CAPAF). At CGAP, she has participated in several train-the-trainer seminars in the capacity of Supervisor. Corinne, a French national,  has been living in Côte d'Ivoire for the past 24 years. She is bilingual (French and English) and holds a Master's degree in Developmental Economics from CERDI, University of Clermont Ferrand, France.

Message from the MFW4A Partnership Coordinator

12.01.2018David Ashiagbor

Dear Reader,

As we begin 2018, I would like to wish you all a happy and prosperous New Year on behalf of all of us at MFW4A.

2017 was a pivotal year for us. We began our transition to a more inclusive Partnership with the integration of African financial sector stakeholders into all levels of our platform.  This new phase also includes a revamped value proposition designed to deliver sharper outcomes.

Our work in 2017 strengthened MFW4A’s position as a leading and independent voice on financial sector development in Africa. Mobilising domestic capital for long term investment was a focus for us. We brought together African pension funds, regulators and development finance experts in Abidjan in November, to identify options and instruments to leverage Africa’s growing pension assets for investment in infrastructure, agriculture and affordable housing. A task force was established to follow up on the meeting’s recommendations, which will continue to guide our work in this area. 

A notable outcome in 2017, was the approval of a $3 million Line of Credit to the Union Trust Bank in Sierra Leone, by the African Development Bank (AfDB) in September 2017, following the Conference on Financial Sector Development in African States Facing Fragile Situations co-hosted by MFW4A in June 2016. Another was the resolution taken by Governors of African central banks and Senior officials of international financial institutions, to strengthen supervision and solution plans for Pan-African banks at the ‘’Cross-Border Banking and Regulatory Reforms in Africa‘’ conference, jointly organized with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) in Mauritius.

Our work in support of a strong and stable African financial sector will continue this year, with national and regional Financial Sector Dialogues in selected regions. These high-level events will provide a platform for African financial sector stakeholders to assess the progress of ongoing reforms in their respective regions and identify future priorities. We will also launch a new programme on Trade Finance to help fill existing knowledge and skills gaps through research, capacity building and advocacy efforts. A Long-term Finance initiative expected to lead to the establishment of a scoreboard that provides comparative indicators of the level of development of long-term finance markets in Africa, will also be launched, in collaboration with AfDB and GIZ.

We will continue to support efforts to develop and implement financial risk management solutions in the agricultural sector while promoting an enabling environment for digital finance. Other activities include research to support diaspora investments and remittances as well as capacity building programmes in our SME Finance and Housing Finance workstreams.

We look forward to your continued support and collaboration.

With our best wishes for a happy and prosperous 2018.

David Ashiagbor
MFW4A Partnership Coordinator


Capital requirement, bank competition and stability in Africa- Q&A Session

05.09.2017Jacob Oduor, Principal Research Economist, African Development Bank

This Q&A session highlights key insights of a study co-authored by Dr. Jacob Oduor, economist with African Development Bank. The research shows that increased capital beef-up significantly increases financial instability in Africa (except in big banks) implying that higher capital requirements did not make African banks safer.

1. Why did you choose a topic on the banking sector, precisely on regulation? Is there any subdued risk with African banking system that justifies your research?

The banking sector is important in driving economic growth through intermediation of investment resources. Its effectiveness in achieving this role can however be undermined by one-size-fit-all regulations. In Africa, where financial inclusion is still low, any regulation that increases the cost of financial services may be counterproductive in achieving the broader economic growth objectives. If increased capital requirements can achieve its core objective of financial stability without adversely affecting the cost of financial services, then it is welcome. That tradeoff is important but sometimes difficult to strike.

2. Basel I, Basel II and now Basel III have called for capital build-up over time. In your view, how will the latest reform affect African banks?

Capital build up has the consequence of creating bigger banks. There are two main problems with this. First, emerging evidence show that bigger banks are not necessarily safe. They perceive themselves to be "too big to fail" and therefore engage in more risky investments and are more vulnerable to shocks that smaller banks (Berger and Mester, 1997[1]) and such regulation may just as well increase banking sector instability in Africa. The second and more important consequence for Africa is that capital build-up concentrates the banking industry, reduces competition, has the potential to drive up costs of financial services and stifle financial inclusion. The high initial capital stringency requirements can impose entry barriers for new entrants and this would restrict competition and allow existing banks to accumulate market power (Berger et al; 1993[2]). In a continent where financial inclusion is pathetically low, such regulation may have more negative consequences than benefits.

3. Your research was centered on the impact of regulatory build-up on first financial sector stability and second competition. What did your research reveal?

The results show that increased capital beef-up significantly increases financial instability in Africa (except in big banks) implying that higher capital requirements did not make African banks safer. We also find that increased regulatory capital improves competitive pricing for foreign banks while it makes domestic banks less competitive. This is mainly attributed to the high cost of sourcing and holding extra capital for domestic banks compared to foreign banks who can source cheaper capital from parent companies. The results put to question the effectiveness of higher regulatory capital on stability and competitiveness of the African financial system.

4. Did you find in your literature review similar conclusions?

While other studies including Furlong and Keeley (1989)[3] and Keeley (1990)[4] found stabilizing effects of increased capital requirements, other studies have come to similar conclusions as our study. Boot and Greenbaum (1993)[5] for instance find that capital requirements reduce monitoring incentives, which reduces the quality of banks' portfolios increasing the risk of instability. Hakenes and Schnabel (2010)[6] on the other hand show that tighter capital requirements increases the risk of individual loans and may also increase a bank's probability of default because they relax the competition for loans and thus destabilizing the banking sector.

On increased capital requirements and competition, similar findings as ours were obtained by Bikker & Groeneveld (1998)[7] who assessed competitive structure in the banking industry in the EU and finds that concentration impairs competitiveness. Similar findings were also obtained by and Claessens and Laeven, 2004[8] among others.

5. In your research, you also test your model for reserve causality. What was the idea behind the test and what did the test show?

The potential for reverse causality emanates from the fact that banks that are viewed by the regulators to be less stable are likely to be asked to keep higher capital ratios compared to more stable banks. Instability may therefore be a cause of higher capital requirements for banks as much as higher capital requirements may be a source of instability. The results using instrumental variables approach, confirm the findings that increased capital ratio increases instability in the banking sector.

6. You mentioned that some critics argue that Basel III is too complex and allows banks to use in-house creative models to hold less capital than they should. Can you talk more about some of these techniques and how can regulators address the shortcoming? How will/should this be addressed in the context of the African continent?

Amendments to the Basel Accord in 1996 permitted regulators to accept assessments from banks' internal risk-management models in setting capital requirements for the market risk in banks' trading portfolios. Consequently, trading-book models have become increasingly common in banks. These models generally estimate value at risk (VaR). Because of the large number of traded securities, trading-book VaR models inevitably use a large number of simplifying assumptions resulting in different estimates of value at risk. It is therefore not inconceivable that some banks use these internal models to understate their risks in order to maintain less regulatory capital which exposes the whole sector to risks. To remedy such situation, regulators must ensure banks calculate their risk weightings and capital requirements on the basis of a common standardized approach. In-house models could be used to supplement but not substitute standard models. To reduce the ability of banks to hide risky assets there is need for reduced discretion of banks in calculating their risk weightings by narrowing the range of modeling choices for banks and improving public disclosure by banks. There is also need to explore regulation with varying standards based on complexity and risk.

7. In the US, the concept of "too big to fail" has emerged as a hot contentious topic between regulators, policy makers and banks. A debate between breaking up large banks or at the very least the reinstatement of some Glass-Steagall-like legislation and the status quo. You cite the example of Nigeria as evidence that consolidation is not the answer to the banking system stability. Do you see any systemic risk associated with the size of the banks operating in our continent? Have some of them reached that critical level?

While this study did not go into establishing the specific threshold beyond which inefficiency sets in, experience has shown that big banks can fail and there is a threshold size beyond which decreasing marginal returns sets in. Attempting to build resilience through indefinite increase in capital requirements may be counterproductive. In addition, capital buffers on their own without accompanying regulations are at best, inadequate. Regulation must therefore look beyond the size of the banks. Market concentration in the banking industry in Africa is high compared to the developed world and therefore the potential for systemic risk exists, but whether some African banks have reached that threshold is an area for further research. What is clear from our results is that prescriptive blanket regulations on capital buffers has not helped reduce that risk. Dealing with systemic risk should not therefore overemphasize on size, but accompanying regulations to ensure good governance and prudent risk taking irrespective of the size.

8. If capital build-up is not the answer to increase financial sector stability, what types of policy should regulators and policy makers pursue/explore in their quest for a strong, deep and liquid financial sector?

Capital build up is still important in building resilience, but it is not the only way to build resilience, not in all contexts and on its own it is inadequate. Regulators must be able to identify the sources of systemic risks and develop regulatory instruments that are able to deal with different kinds of risks. Internal governance weaknesses is turning out to be a major source of instability in the banking sector in many countries both in Africa and in more developed markets. This kind of risk cannot be cured by increasing capital buffers. Improvements in monitoring and supervision of banks may as well give the same financial stability outcome without jeopardizing financing inclusion objectives.

9. What is your opinion on the emerging rivalry between fintechs and banks and do you see this as an inevitable event to improve efficiency and increase inclusion? From the regulatory stand-point, what if need be, can be improved?

Without a doubt, fintechs have disrupted the business-as-usual way of traditional banks and helped improve financial access and efficiency beyond the boundaries that traditional banks were willing to go. From mobile money payment and transfer services, to savings and credit services through the mobile phone platforms, fintechs have proved to the banks that your can reach the low-income unbanked and still make profits. Banks are increasingly adopting the same approaches to delivery financial services in order to stay in business. However, in some instances, the pace of adoption of new technologies in the financial sector is faster than regulations. A number of regulators have not developed tools and infrastructure including state of the art reporting and analytics infrastructure to support and sufficiently regulate the fintech innovations. In most cases, fintech companies are discouraged by the time and cost of registering and complying with regulations. This is a particular problematic in the financial services sector in Africa where political interests are still intense and where intruders coming to share the profits are not welcome. In addition, regulations should be flexible and fintech companies should not be forced into the same costly regulatory mold as traditional banks, which may stifle innovative capacity of start-ups.

--------------------

[1] Berger, A. N. & L. J. Mester. 1997. Inside the black box: What Explains Differences in The Efficiencies of Financial Institutions? Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 21, pp. 895-947

[2] Berger A. N., W. Hunter, and S. Timme. 1993. The Efficiency of Financial Institutions: A Review and Preview of Research Past, Present, and Future, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.17 pp. 221-249

[3] Furlong, F. T. and M. C. Keeley. 1989. Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking: A Note, Journal of Banking and Finance 13, 883-891.

[4] Keeley, M. C. 1990. Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, American Economic Review, Vol. 80(5), pp. 1183-1200

[5] Boot, A.W., and S. Greenbaum. 1993. Bank Regulation, Reputation, and Rents: Theory and Policy Implications. In: Mayer, C., and Vives, X. (eds), Capital Markets andFinancial Intermediation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 292-318.

[6] Hakenes, H. and I. Schnabel. 2010. Capital Regulation, Bank Competition, and Financial Stability, Leibniz University of Hannover, MPI Bonn, and CEPR

[7] Bikker J.A. and J.M. Groeneveld. 1998. Competition and Concentration in the EU Banking Industry Research Series Supervision 8, Netherlands Central Bank, Directorate Supervision

[8] Claessens, Stijn, and Luc Laeven. 2004. What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and BankingVol. 36, pp. 563-583

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

About the Author

Dr. Jacob Oduor is Principal Research Economist at African Development Bank (AfDB). He is a holder of Ph.D in Economics from Bielefeld University, Germany. He is also a holder of MA (Economics) and BA (Economics)- First Class Honours from Kenyatta University, Nairobi, Kenya. Prior to joining AfDB, Dr. Oduor lectured in the School of Economics at Kenyatta University and he worked with the Cooperative Bank of Kenya and the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA). Dr. Oduor is an accomplished time series econometrician specialized in: time series, cointegration, general macroeconomic theory and policy, monetary policy and growth theory.

Pension funds can play a pivotal role in African aspirations for 2063

19.06.2017Gerald Gondo, Business Development Executive, RisCura Africa

African equities have recently faced strong headwinds, despite the positive fundamental growth prospects presented by the continent, writes RisCura Africa's Business Development Executive, Gerald Gondo.

If one considers the negative return profiles of a number of the African equity indices over the last two years, it would not be surprising if investors questioned the much-vaunted tag-lines of "Africa rising" and "demographic dividend". Should they retain their confidence that Africa will master its short-term challenges and look to the long-term prospects?

An important element of the African investment case is the oft-cited demographic dividend - referring to a period where a country's workforce is young, willing and able to be integrated into the economy and thus continue its economic growth. But, other elements such as rising disposable income, urbanisation, untapped resources and agriculture also reinforce the need to look beyond short-term challenges and rather to calibrate one's expectations towards the long-term. These drivers are set to continue to develop and arguably present the prospect of compelling organic growth waiting to be unlocked.

The questions investors should be asking are who and how will Africa unlock this growth?

African governments and policy-makers appear quite clear and resolute in their outlook. Evidence of this is the 28th African Union (AU) Summit held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in January 2017 whose theme was, "Harnessing the Demographic Dividend through Investments in Youth".

This was perhaps a clarion call by Africa's leadership to revisit its investment case by focussing on possibly its most durable and resilient growth proponent - its youth.

Turning to the AU's "African Aspirations for 2063" - six aspirations aimed at realising the continent's potential by 2063 - Aspiration 1 reads as follows:"A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development. We are determined to eradicate poverty in one generation and build shared prosperity through social and economic transformation of the continent."

Critical to making in-roads in achieving this aspiration requires African governments, policy-makers, and regulators to undertake a critical review of inhibitors to effective inclusive growth and sustainable development. Deepening, integrating and developing African capital markets is an obvious and immediate area to target.

According to a Milken Institute - Centre for Financial Markets study, "Capital Markets in the East African Community - Developing the Buyside", these markets are fundamental to economic growth because they help to channel domestic savings in a more productive way. Thereby enabling the private sector to invest, produce and create jobs. African pension funds have been cited as a growing pool of assets that can and should be channelled towards deepening capital markets.

At RisCura, we continue to observe and record the growing asset bases of African pension funds due to rising incomes, with emphasis on the need for these funds to look to diversify their investments away from traditional investments. Particular focus is given to the continued elevated levels of exposure that many African pension funds still have to government fixed income securities, which could largely be attributed to static regulation.

A separate Milken institute study in East African pension funds found that "preferential treatment generally given to government securities through regulatory approaches - specifically, relatively high portfolio ceilings - may induce funds to over allocate to this asset class at the expense of others."

If Africa is to progress towards achieving Aspiration 1, alongside the remaining six and equally important Aspirations, the pace of capital market reforms needs to be accelerated. RisCura has previously noted several major African countries have revised pension regulations in recent years, with many either considering or actually revising rules around investments such as allowing investments into private equity and non-traditional asset classes. However, the pace of revision remains slow.

Deepening of capital markets may take time, but the channelling of savings towards productive sectors of the economy is not limited only to listed capital markets. Allocations to private equity and infrastructure as alternative assets classes through the burgeoning African private equity and infrastructure funds, will serve as critical interventions to accelerating economic development in Africa.

Regulatory reform will serve as a powerful driver for increased investment that deepen and develop African capital markets. African pension funds and institutional investors have an important and critical role to play in assisting Africa (through prudent channelling of savings) with projects and initiatives that can accelerate the fulfilment of Aspiration 1.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

About the Author

Gerald Gondo serves as an Executive within RisCura Africa and is responsible for Business Development. Prior to joining RisCura, Gerald was also a founding partner of a specialist investment advisory and investment management business (Atria Africa) based in Mauritius. Gerald's passion to have first-hand experience in investing in Africa led him to join a leading pan-African asset manager (Imara Asset Management) where he had dual responsibility of being lead analyst on listed equities in Egypt, Morocco, Zambia and Mauritius whilst also building the fixed income capability of Imara Asset Management in Zimbabwe. He started his career in private equity investment in Sub-Saharan Africa (Business Partners) and has also worked as a credit analyst for a highly-rated specialist institutional fixed income boutique (Futuregrowth Asset Management), where he was responsible for credit analysis for corporate credit and securitisation issuances within South Africa.

The Supervisory Challenges of Financial Inclusion

06.06.2017Dr. Bryan Barnett, Banking Advisor US Treasury, Office of Technical Assistance

This post was originally posted on the AFI website.

In pursuit of their mission to ensure the integrity of financial systems, regulators have two distinct tasks. The first is developing the rules and regulations that govern the authorization and operations of financial institutions. The second is supervising those institutions to ensure that regulations are followed and risks are identified and addressed.

Over the last several decades, the drive to include populations formerly excluded from the formal financial system has introduced new kinds of financial products, service providers and digital technologies that have improved the lives of millions, but pose challenges for regulators on both the policy and supervision fronts. Though these developments have generated a significant amount of interest in regulatory policy, the impact of new policies on the task of actual supervision has received relatively little attention. And while there is still work to be done on the policy front, there is now an urgent need to address the practical impact of these policies on actual supervision of financial service providers (FSPs). In a rapidly changing environment, a definitive account of these impacts may not be possible, but it's not too early to consider some of the major issues and the resulting need for capacity building among financial supervisors.

Most apparent among these issues is the dramatic expansion of the number and types of financial institutions that regulators are required to supervise. Once responsible for supervising a limited number of banks, they are now increasingly expected to supervise an array of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), including microfinance institutions, cooperatives, SACCOs, mobile money issuers, and others. In contrast to traditional banks which are relatively few and relatively large, NBFIs are for the most part numerous and small. A supervisor formerly responsible for at most a couple of dozen institutions may now be responsible for hundreds. And whereas all banks are broadly similar, there is now much greater heterogeneity among the types of institutions and products subject to oversight.

At the same time, the increasing use of agents that may number in the tens of thousands poses special challenges. Though it is widely accepted that principals are responsible for oversight of their own agents, the task of ensuring that principals are fulfilling this requirement adequately is generally a new and different responsibility for many financial regulators. To this must be added rapid evolution in electronic payment systems, involving a host of new types of payment service providers and payment technologies. Gone are the days when it was enough to keep an eye on things like check clearing, cards or the ACH.

Since the global financial crisis of 2008-09, there is everywhere a heightened concern for consumer protection. It is a concern of special significance to financial inclusion programs that aspire to reach customers with limited literacy (financial or otherwise). Enhanced supervision under new consumer protection rules is for many regulators a largely new domain of responsibility, again multiplied by the large number of service providers concerned.

Related to all these issues is the requirement that license applications for new entrants be reviewed prior to approval and increasingly a requirement also that all new financial inclusion products be pre-approved by the regulator before being introduced. This process is exceedingly labor intensive, often requiring multiple iterations of a cycle of feedback and re-submission before a final decision is reached. Workloads are directly proportional to the pace of expansion and change in a financial services marketplace where innovation and expansion in the name of greater inclusion is often strongly encouraged. That means that workloads are expanding rapidly, threatening careful review or timely decisions or both.

These challenges are uniformly driven by policies that are here to stay and the major implications are now clear. First of all, there will never be enough staff to meet these challenges using traditional approaches. For many FSPs on-site examinations will necessarily be cursory, relatively rare or both. Moreover, with very limited human resources (relative to the scale of the task), the adoption of a risk-based approach to supervision will cease to be merely a desirable goal and will become an absolute condition of effective supervision. Given the need to develop risk profiles on numerous FSPs and products, it will be necessary to concentrate on the development of sound sector-based risk assessments and validated risk indicators that can be monitored remotely. This in turn suggests that the traditional separation of on-site and off-site supervision will need to be overcome and individual supervisors will have to be equipped to employ both approaches as and where indicated without regard for geographic proximity or any sort of programmed schedule.

Beyond sheer numbers, the heterogeneity among types of institutions and products suggests that greater specialization among available staff will be essential. This is especially acute in the case of payment systems which have significantly different mechanics and operating rules from one to the next. Moreover, the risks associated with these systems are generally not the credit or market risks associated with prudentially regulated institutions, but are primarily operational and liquidity risks that need special attention. In particular, this applies to the complex technology upon which all modern payment systems rely. There is no possibility of adequate supervision of these payment systems absent properly specialized expertise on the part of individual personnel.

Thinking about possible means to address some of these challenges, a few things are clear. First, regulators will have to rely much more heavily on information technology and develop the ability to effectively gather and analyze large amounts of remotely-collected data. This means careful attention to the structuring of data collected in monthly or quarterly reports. It means the end of reports submitted as spreadsheets that are manually consolidated and the universal use of web-based report submission backed by automated preprocessing to ensure accuracy and completeness. There will need to be a much greater use of statistical techniques to establish what is normal among a particular set of providers so that anomalies can be isolated and investigated quickly.

With respect to licensing and pre-authorization of products, it will be essential to develop simple efficient systems whereby applications can be entered electronically, workflow can be tracked, and routine communications can be automated. Where regulators are granted discretion to judge the appropriateness or adequacy of an applicant's proposed businesses or products, it will be necessary to articulate clear expectations and guidelines for the exercise of that discretion in order to alert applicants and reduce the volume of deficient applications that needlessly consume staff time.

For agents, the assignment of a unique ID for each agent and the creation of national agent registries will be necessary to provide principals with critical information about a prospective agent's prior history as an agent (if any) allowing them to avoid the cost of taking on agents with a questionable background. The same registry will facilitate consumer protection if each agent's ID number is displayed at its place of business, allowing customers to make complaints without having to otherwise collect identifying information on the agent in question.

Such a registry and ID system will also enable the development of apps allowing customers to easily rate agents or file complaints directly from their phone. That also means that supervisors will need to be prepared to process a potentially significant volume of customer complaints, some of which will be referred to a provider for resolution, others which may involve escalation of complaints that a provider has failed to address. Basic systems for tracking and analyzing these complaints will be necessary. Such systems are a common feature of many businesses, but will be very new to most regulators.

Finally, with regard to the rapidly evolving and ever more complex world of technology supporting financial inclusion, regulators will have to move away from the practice of directly inspecting provider's IT infrastructure using the regulator's own staff and will instead have to rely on a variety of qualified independent auditors and recognized international standards for certification of systems and the management of IT systems. At the same time, if not themselves conducting IT audits, supervisory staff will nevertheless need to be able to read and understand the recommendations contained in auditors' reports in order to ensure that recommendations are followed and issues are addressed.

These are surely not the only changes to traditional regulatory practice that will ultimately be required. And there can be no expectation that the changes required will be easy or quick to achieve. But it is vital that regulators begin to contemplate the future and start to plan for it. At the same time, it is critical that technical assistance and capacity building help regulators adapt traditional supervisory approaches to the new environment. The needed changes will take time and inevitably proceed in stages. But with careful prioritization and a commitment to continual progress it will soon enough be possible to look back and wonder what it was that originally seemed so daunting.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

About the Author

Dr. Bryan Barnett is an advisor for banking and financial services with the Office of Technical Assistance of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. He works with financial regulators in developing countries to help them modernize and strengthen their financial systems. A major focus of his work is helping regulators adapt regulations and processes to support expanded access to financial services to underserved populations.

ABOUT THE AFF

What do renowned economists, financial sector practitioners, academics, and activists think about current issues of financial sector development in Africa? Find out on the blog - and share your point of view with us!

LATEST POSTS

The Digital World and a Human Economy: Mobile Money and...Sean Maliehe & John Sharp, Research Fellows, University of Pretoria
DFS Customer Development Opportunities in NigeriaJacqueline Jumah, Senior Analyst, MicroSave & Irene Wagaki, DFS Consultant
Financial Education: The Key to the Development of African...Emmanuel Zamblé, Expert-Consultant in Capital Markets

LATEST COMMENTS