Africa Finance Forum
Factoring in Africa
The immense contribution that factoring can make to small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) is the primary reason that has made this financing tool one of the most attractive to businesses across the world. Unfortunately, Africa has remained on the fringes of the factoring movement until recently. In 2012, Africa accounted for only 1.2 per cent of the €2 trillion world factoring transactions, with activities being recorded in only four countries - South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. South Africa, whose factoring transactions are mainly domestic, accounted for about 90 per cent of those transactions. Conversely, Asia was responsible for 26.8 per cent of the world factoring transactions while, America accounted for 8.81 per cent, Australia for 2.35 per cent and Europe for 60.91 per cent.
The good news
There is good news, however. Africa appears poised to take to the global stage with regard to factoring as a tool for economic development as the continent is now witnessing a sustained quickening in the rate of expansion of factoring volumes.
For instance, total factoring volumes in Africa exploded from €5.86 billion in 2001 to €23.93 billion in 2012, an average annual growth rate of approximately 14.2 per cent. This number is significantly higher than the world factoring growth rate of 8.6 per cent and the European growth rate of nine per cent during the same period. Additionally, Africa's factoring growth has featured strong dominance by banks and bank subsidiaries. This is the case in South Africa, Morocco and Egypt, where there have only been a limited number of independent private factoring companies. That situation is borne out of the fact that an important service offered by factors in Africa is funded credit lines for which affiliation with a bank that has the capacity to grant a credit limit provides important competitive advantage.
Not surprisingly, Africa's factoring market is narrow. An average of about 80 per cent of the demand is domestic, which explains the dominance of South Africa with its relatively strong supply chains. Within the context of constrained credit insurance capacity, even in markets where factoring is flourishing, appetite for risk has been understandably limited with a heavy focus on risk of governments and blue chip companies, especially those in the mining, telecom and retail sectors.
The low level of factoring across Africa can be attributed to a number of reasons, the major ones being:
- A lack, or limited knowledge, of the product across a large segment of the population, coupled with the fact that there has been little effort to promote factoring by governments and global factoring industry groups, including Factors Chain International and the International Factors Group, until the mid-2000s. In an environment dominated by a two-factor mind-set, it has been difficult to grow factoring in the face of reluctance among foreign factors to do business in Africa. In addition, due to limited knowledge, many African governments and regulators had little interest in promoting factoring;
- Lack of interest in factoring by many businesses. Those businesses involved in international trade tended to export commodities to OECD countries on the basis of Cash Against Documents (CAD) with credit worthy buyers. No credit was given so the trade did not lend itself to factoring;
- Absence of an incentive for banks to pursue factoring as a line of business, whether as a product offering or by way of credit lines, due to limited demand traceable to ignorance about the product and absence of support from regulators; and
- Absence of facilitating infrastructure, such as appropriate regulatory framework and laws, as well as credit information services and credit insurance. This has constrained the entry of foreign factors in the African market.
Prospects for factoring in Africa
In spite of these challenges, the fact that factoring is surging to the fore in Africa with forecasts that factoring volumes will rise from €24 billion in 2012 to about €90 billion in 2017 and subsequently to about €200 billion by 2020, means that there is reason to be hopeful. Countries expected to drive this growth are "new" entrants to factoring and include Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and Senegal. It is anticipated that domestic factoring will continue to dominate in Africa, accounting for about 80 per cent of the market, although country situations will differ.
This anticipated growth is projected to be driven by:
- Entities in oil and mining services in countries that are heavy on extractive industries, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Zambia;
- Telecommunications services, as a result of a rapid growth of this sector and tendency of telecom companies to outsource key services;
- Retail sector, as a result of a rapid growth of the middle class, which will expand domestic demand and reinforce the growth of market economy in the continent; and
- The non-traditional export sector driven by larger share of the South in Africa's trade.
Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that factoring is gaining currency on the continent. The expectation is that factoring in Africa will continue to grow, considering the level of growth in economic activities and trade, particularly in light of the strengthening of domestic supply chains, rising South-South trade, rapid growth of Africa's middle class and improved awareness about factoring across the continent.
Dr. Benedict Okey Oramah is Executive Vice-President, Business Development and Corporate Banking, at the African Export-Import Bank. He supervises the business development, syndications, specialized finance and investment banking operations of the Bank. Prior to joining the Bank in 1994, he was Assistant Manager (Research) at the Nigerian Export-Import Bank. He received a PhD in agricultural economics from Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
To reduce asymmetric information problems associated with extending credit and increase the chances of loan repayment, banks typically require collateral from their borrowers. Movable assets - assets that are not affixed permanently to a building (e.g., equipment, receivables)- often account for most of the capital stock of private firms and comprise an especially large share for micro, small and medium-size enterprises. Hence, movable assets are the main type of collateral that firms, especially those in developing countries, can pledge to obtain bank financing. While a sound legal and regulatory framework is essential to allow movable assets to be used as collateral, without a well-functioning registry for movable assets, even the best secured transactions laws could be ineffective or even useless.
Given the importance of collateral registries for moveable assets, 18 countries have established such registries in the past decade. However, to my knowledge there is no systematic empirical evidence on whether such reforms have been effective in fulfilling their primary goal: improving firms' access to bank finance.
In a recent paper, Inessa Love, Sandeep Singh and I explore the impact of introducing collateral registries for movable assets on firms' access to bank finance using firm-level surveys for 73 countries. Following a difference-in-difference approach, we compare access to bank finance pre and post the introduction of movable collateral registries in seven countries (Bosnia, Croatia, Guatemala, Peru, Rwanda, Serbia, and Ukraine) against three different "control" groups: a) firms in all countries that did not implement collateral reforms during our sample frame (59 countries), b) firms in a sample of countries matched by location and income per capita to the countries that introduced movable collateral registries (7 countries), and c) firms in countries that undertook collateral legal reforms but did not set up registries for movable assets (7 countries). This difference-in-difference approach controlling for fixed country and time effects allows us to isolate the impact of the introduction of movable collateral registries on firms' access to bank finance.
Overall, we find that introducing movable collateral registries increases firms' access to bank finance. In particular, our baseline estimations indicate that the introduction of registries for movable assets is associated with an increase in the likelihood that a firm has a bank loan, line of credit or overdraft, a rise in the share of the firm's working capital and fixed assets financed by banks, a reduction in the interest rates paid on loans, and an increase in the maturity of bank loans.
The impact of the introduction of movable collateral registries is economically significant: registry reform increases access to bank finance by almost 8 percentage points and access to loans by 7 percentage points. These are sizeable effects considering that in our sample, about 60 percent of firms have access to finance and 47 percent have a loan. There is also some evidence that the impact of the introduction of registries for movable assets on firms' access to bank finance is larger among smaller firms, who also report a reduction in a subjective, perception-based measure of finance obstacles.
Our findings suggest that policymakers in Africa would be wise to adopt movable collateral registries to facilitate firms' access to finance. Currently, in the region, only 8 countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania) have such registries. Clearly, there is scope for reform throughout the continent in this area.
MARIA SOLEDAD MARTINEZ PERIA is the Research Manager of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team of the Development Economics Research Group at The World Bank. Her published work has focused on currency and banking crises, depositor market discipline, foreign bank participation in developing countries, bank financing to SMEs, the impact of remittances on financial development and the spread of the recent financial crisis. Prior to joining The World Bank, Sole worked at the Brookings Institution, the Central Bank of Argentina, the Federal Reserve Board, and the International Monetary Fund. She holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley and a B.A. from Stanford University.
The recent financial crisis has heightened attention to the links between the financial systems and the real economy. Policy makers, especially in developing countries, have expressed a greater degree of interest in the design, development, and implementation of national strategies for developing the financial sector. Equally, policy makers have increased their investment in reporting on financial sector stability and are making greater efforts to link financial sector performance and risks to the real economy. Between 1996 and 2005, publishing of financial sector reports became a rapidly growing "industry," with the number of central banks issuing such reports increasing worldwide from 1 to about 50. Since 2005, this number has grown less rapidly, although it has kept increasing and has now reached about 80.
In a forthcoming publication, we assessed a sample of 78 countries on the comprehensiveness of their financial sector strategies. We did so against 10 predefined attributes that we postulated a comprehensive financial strategy should have. Broadly, these attributes concerned identification of financial development objectives, approach to managing systemic risk involved in achieving the set objectives, consideration of trade-offs between achieving development objectives and maintaining systemic risk in the financial sector at an acceptable level, and outline of implementation plans for the financial sector strategy.
We found that only 67 percent of the 78 countries had financial sector strategies with clearly identified goals and that only 27 percent had a quantifiable indicator included in their statement of objectives. Given that only 58 percent of strategies identify policy tools to support the achievement of the set goals, 42 percent of strategies rely on wishful thinking rather than on credible policy support. Overall, we find that the scope and characteristics of national strategies for the financial sector are influenced by a country's type of legal system, its level of income and macroeconomic stability, its existing financial depth and inclusion, the share of foreign ownership in its national financial sector, and its experience of past financial crises.
Significantly, we found that although many countries commit to both development and systemic risk management (55 percent) in their strategy; only 26 percent specify trade-offs between their financial development goals and management of systemic risk in their strategies. Overall, 42 percent of countries commit to both advancing financial development and managing systemic risk but do not consider any trade-offs between the two goals. Although most strategies refer to systemic risk in general terms (88 percent), many fewer documents (38 percent) refer to specific indicators of systemic risk, and only about a half (51 percent) of the strategies identify policy tools to manage that risk.
The absence of substantive discussions on risk-development trade-offs in financial sector strategies is troubling. Finance is well-known to be a double-edged sword - substantial developmental impact when it performs well and the major social costs when it does not. The double relevance of financial systems thus puts a high premium on carefully calibrated and implemented financial sector policies. Therefore, financial sector policy must account for the trade-off between the speed of financial development and the systemic risk accumulation. This trade-off is analogous to the risk-return trade-off in finance. At the national level, the financial sector strategy formulates policy for the financial sector and chooses how much speed and how much restraint to apply, and where. Overall, the strategy should set development targets that account for the associated risk and communicate the systemic risk appetite (tolerance) of the country in the financial area.
Admittedly, determining if a given financial sector strategy has adequately considered and communicated trade-offs between the speed of financial development and the degree of systemic risk associated with it-or, for that matter, gauging whether the strategy involves plans to address the trade-off-is challenging, but not impossible. To that end, we examined the strategies to see whether risk and return in development had been explicitly weighed. We noted whether strategies referred to the expectation that the financial system would work well-that is, would it allocate resources to the most productive uses and help the real economy, including individuals and firms, manage risks by enhancing productivity, boosting the poverty-reduction effects of growth, and promoting equal opportunity? We then looked to see whether the strategies also referred to concerns that overambitious development, excessive risk taking, and malfunctioning risk management on the side of the financial system and its clients could create a breeding ground for costly financial crises.
In general, we found that strategies include a lot of numerical analysis on recent trends and changes in the financial sector; however, they lack a comprehensive discussion of trade-offs in general and of the trade-off between financial development and systemic risk in particular. At best, they acknowledge that economic growth is negatively affected by financial sectors that are weak or unable to provide long-term capital. This is a general reference to the performance of the sector in aggregate and not explicit reference to specific systemic risks or to trade-offs between risk and development of the sector.
Our findings are consistent with research that suggests that although the process of preparing a strategy involves a lot of scientific analysis of data, it lacks the creation of novel hypotheses and careful generation of custom-tailored tests of those hypotheses. That conventional strategies are focused on isolated issues rather than making choices, an approach that would naturally lead to a discussion of trade-offs. We support the view that many strategies are merely an aggregation of issues into an all-inclusive reform program aimed at modernizing a financial system. What is needed is a 'possibilities-based approach' that balances ambition with obstacles and risks; requiring governments to recognize that they must make choices and that each choice has consequences.
To encourage risk-development trade-offs discussions in strategy formulation discussions, we emphasize the importance of establishing a financial policy or stability committee. To set compatible and sustainable policies for the financial system, a group of policy makers and experts that understands the risk-development trade-offs in financial sector development should be established. Most important, the committee's terms of reference must explicitly encourage the discussion of choices for financial sector development. Only then will norms for discussing trade-offs between risk and development be established. Formulating financial sector strategy through such policy dialogue can improve policy coordination and produce balanced policies.
In essence, our paper calls for a more dynamic strategy design, development and implementation process than is presently found in many countries around the world.
Samuel Munzele Maimbo is an Adjunct Professor of Finance at the University of Lusaka, a Simon Industrial Fellow at the University of Manchester and a Lead Financial Sector Specialist in the European and Central Asia region of the World Bank. Prior to joining the World Bank, he was a Senior Bank Inspector at the Bank of Zambia and an auditor at Price Waterhouse. A Rhodes Scholar, Samuel obtained a PhD in Public Administration from the University of Manchester, England (2001); a MBA Degree from the University of Nottingham, England (1998); a Bachelor of Accountancy Degree from the Copperbelt University, Zambia (1994). He is also a Fellow of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, United Kingdom and a Fellow of the Zambia Institute of Certified Accountants.
Let me say again that I see a huge gap between the potential of new electronic channels and the results that are being observed on the ground. Much as we might convince ourselves of the inexorable logic of bringing financial services to the corner shop near where people live (agent banking) and right onto their hands (mobile money), what I see as I visit country after developing country is too much effort and too many resources being expended in entirely sub-scale operations. Must getting there feel so hard?
Commercial players: don't play hero
As in any network business, mobile money operations are about numbers of customers and breadth of ecosystems. Unless you have the kind of scale Safaricom had in Kenya, are you sure you want to tackle the whole mobile money ecosystem on your own?
Are you sure you can convince people to get off using that grimy physical cash which touches and is immediately accepted by everyone, and instead hop onto your private, exclusive electronic cloud? Your cloud would cast such a bigger shadow on cash if it was combined with all other similar clouds into a single, interconnected electronic payment network for everyone.
Are you sure you want to make the management of cash in/out (CICO) -that thing which wears you down and which you so dearly would like to go away-the key competitive battlefield with everyone else who abhors cash as much as you do? Your cloud would be much more accessible for those sadly stuck on cash if you joined forces with all the other electronic types and worked together to create CICO networks that work for all of providers.
Are you sure you want to take it upon yourself to sign up every primary school who wants to bill parents, and to sign up every small employer who wants to pay employees, one by one? They will not want to force all their parents and employees to join your cloud, and yet they will not have the appetite to sign up with every other cloud, so they'll feel it's easier to just continue with cash like they have always done. They would be so much amenable to e-payments if the various players empowered a few payment aggregators to work on their collective behalf in signing up those schools and employers and distributing the transactions according to who has which parents and workers as their customers.
If players are able to leverage the collective scale, the total will be more than the sum of the parts. But getting to this result requires that the industry as a whole work out which areas they must collaborate on and which areas they want to fight tooth and nail on. Now competition between mobile money operators tends to be focused on size of payment network, ubiquity and liquidity of cash in/out points, and the length of the list of billers/bulk payers signed up. Those are precisely the aspects on which scale matters most, but the resulting fragmentation is only making cash loom more supreme. How about if these became areas of collaboration, and the competitive field was shifted to brand, customer service, product development and quality of user interface instead? Aren't these, in fact, the things that should turn on modern digital-based services?
Regulators: tear down those walls
Many regulators have gone to surprising lengths to allow new services to emerge, often without explicit regulation, against prevailing orthodoxy. But still, when the supply response is so weak as it is in many countries, policymakers have to wonder whether there are other tacks they can take to spur the market on.
For one, free up cash in/out (CICO) networks from the clutches of banks and mobile money operators. Forcing service providers to be contractually responsible for anything that goes on in thousands of stores (the current regulatory mantra) is not only illusory but counterproductive: how can such fuzzy liability not lead to smaller, proprietary cash networks? Instead, create a license for CICO networks, with clear consumer protection rules, and let them operate for any and all financial service providers. All they would need to be a CICO point for a given bank or mobile money provider, beyond having a CICO licence, would be to have a funded account with that institution and access to their secure, real-time electronic channel.
Many regulators can also give up on their aspirations to be match-makers for happy bank-telco partnerships. These are not natural things, they remain rare on the ground to this day. They may emerge in time, but don't predicate the development of the sector on two species with different genetic make-up mating and working together (India's RBI, take note). Let banks and telcos compete, under clear guidelines and a level playing field. Let telcos and other non-bank players contest the market with an e-money license that exempts them from onerous prudential regulations for the very good reason that (if they are licensed and supervised properly) they do not create new prudential risks. Let banks compete on the basis of the same third-party CICO and account opening regulations that apply to non-banks, for the equally good reason that CICO and anti-money laundering risks are the same no matter who the account issuer is.
Regulators need to offer pathways to mobile money providers that require less commercial brute force. And providers need to develop a more nuanced view of how they can cooperate to build a new market and compete to gain share within that market. Such is the modern way with most network and digital industries.
Ignacio Mas is an independent consultant on mobile money and technology-enabled models for financial inclusion. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Saïd Business School at the University of Oxford, and a Senior Fellow at the Fletcher School's Center for Emerging Market Enterprises at Tufts University. Previously, he was Deputy Director of the Financial Services for the Poor program at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and Global Business Strategy Director at the Vodafone Group.
It is about two years ago that the AfDB, GIZ and World Bank published the Financing Africa book, a broad analysis of trends in Africa's financial systems, of gaps and challenges, and of different policy options. For researchers focused on Africa's financial systems, the past years have been exciting, with many different forms of innovations being introduced and assessed. But there have also been new challenges for analysts and policy makers alike, as I will lay out in the following. Cooperation between different stakeholders, including practitioners, donors, policy makers and researchers can help move forward the frontier for Africa's financial systems. In the following, I will focus on five areas where more data and more research can support better informed policy making.
One first area is that of long-term finance, which can be seen as the second (next to lack of financial inclusion) critical dimension of shallow financial markets in Africa. As documented in the Financing Africa publication, there is a bias on banks' balance sheets toward short-term liabilities and, more critically, short-term assets, only few countries have liquid equity and debt markets, and there is a dearth of effective contractual savings institutions, such as insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds. This dearth of long-term financial intermediation is in contrast to the enormous need for long-term financing across the continent, for purposes of infrastructure, long-term firm financing for investment and housing finance.
The long-term finance agenda is an extensive one, both for researchers and policy makers. First, there is still a dearth of data on long-term financing arrangements, including on corporate bond market structures and costs, insurance markets and private equity funds. Second, identifying positive examples and gauging interventions and policies will be critical, as will be expanding to Africa the small literature on equity funds and their effect on enterprises that exists for U.S. and Europe and (increasingly) for emerging markets. One important constraint mentioned in the context of long-term finance is the lack of risk mitigation tools. Partial credit guarantees can play an important role, but their design and actual impact has not been studied sufficiently yet.
Small enterprise growth
A second important challenge is that of extending the financial inclusion agenda from micro- up to small enterprises, both in terms of supply- and demand-side constraints. The emphasis stems from the realization that job-intensive and transformational growth is more likely to come through formal than informal enterprises. Assessing different lending techniques, delivery channels and organizational structures conducive to small business lending is important, as is assessing the interaction of firms' financing constraints with other constraints, including lack of managerial ability and financial literacy. This research agenda is important for both financial institutions and policy makers. For financial institutions, the rewards can lie in identifying appropriate products for small enterprises and entrepreneurial constraints that might prevent take-up and impact repayment behavior by small enterprises.
For policy makers, the rewards can lie in identifying policies and institutions that are most relevant in alleviating small firms' growth constraints.
Regulatory reform agenda
A third important challenge refers to regulatory reform. While global discussions and reform processes are driven and dominated by the recent Global Financial Crisis and the fragility concerns of economies with developed if not sophisticated financial markets, Africa's fragility concerns are different and its reform capacity lower. Some of the suggested or implemented reforms seem irrelevant for almost all African countries (such as centralizing over-the-counter trades) or might have substantially worse effects in the context of shallow financial markets than in sophisticated markets increasingly dominated by high frequency trading (such as securities trading taxes). Prioritizing regulatory reforms according to risks and opportunity costs for financial deepening and inclusion is therefore critical in the definition of the regulatory reform agenda for African countries. While not necessarily an area for fundamental academic research, financial sector researchers can contribute to this conversation by helping identify regulatory constraints for financial deepening and broadening and potential sources for stability risks, based on past experiences from Africa and other regions.
A fourth important challenge is that of cross-border banking and the necessary regulatory framework. Identifying cross-border linkages between countries is critical, and data collections, such as by Claessens and van Horen (2014), represent an important first step. Understanding the channels through which cross-border banking can help deepen financial systems and foster real integration, and the channels through which cross-border banks can threaten financial stability, is critical. In this context, the optimal design of cross-border cooperation between regulators and supervisors to minimize risks from cross-border banking while maximizing its benefits is important (Beck and Wagner, 2013). African supervisors have been addressing the challenge of regulatory cooperation both on the bi-lateral and sub-regional level as well as on the regional level, with the establishment of the Community of African Bank Supervisors. Financial research can support this cooperation and integration process.
The politics of financial sector reform
A final important area is the political economy of financial sector reform. Short-term political interests and election cycles undermine the focus on long-term financial development; interests to maintain the dominant position of elites undermine the incentives of governments to undertake reforms that can open up financial systems and, thus, dilute the dominant position of the elites. On the other hand, the financial sector is critical for an open, competitive, and contestable economy because it provides the necessary resources for new entrants and can thus support economic transformation. Better understanding the political constraints in financial sector reforms and identifying windows of opportunity are therefore important. Focusing on the creation of broader groups with a stake in further financial deepening can help develop a dynamic process of financial sector reforms. An increasing literature has tried to understand the political economy of financial sector reform in developed and emerging markets; extending this literature to Africa can support the optimal design of financial sector reform programs.
Research in these five areas will have to be supported by an array of new data and a variety of methodological approaches. This implies expanding data availability towards non-bank providers, such as equity funds, but also exploiting existing data sources better, including credit registry and central bank data sets. In addition to exploiting more extensive micro-level data sets, a variety of methodological approaches is called for. I would like to point to just two of them. First, randomized experiments involving both households and micro- and small enterprises will shed light on specific technologies and products that can help overcome the barriers to financial inclusion in Africa. One of the challenges to overcome will be to include spill-over effects and thus move beyond partial equilibrium results to aggregate results. Second, further studies evaluating the effect of specific policy interventions can give insights into which policy reforms are most effective in enhancing sustainable financial deepening and positive real sector outcomes.
For research to succeed in obtaining the necessary data, asking relevant questions but also maximizing its impact, a close interaction between researchers and donors, practitioners and policy makers is necessary. This relationship can often be critical for obtaining micro-level data, such as from credit registries or specific financial institutions, or for undertaking experiments or RCTs. However, these links are also critical for disseminating research findings and having an impact on practice and policy in the financial sector.
Thorsten Beck is Professor of Banking and Finance at Cass Business School in London and Professor of Economics at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. He was the founding chair of the European Banking Center at Tilburg University from 2008 to 2013. Previously he worked in the research department of the World Bank and has also worked as consultant for - among others - the IMF, the European Commission, and the German Development Corporation. His research and policy work has focused on international banking and corporate finance and has been published in /Journal of Finance/, /Journal of Financial Economics/, /Journal of Monetary Economics/ and /Journal of Economic Growth/. His research and policy work has focused on Eastern, Central and Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. He is also Research Fellow in the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London and a Fellow in the Center for Financial Studies in Frankfurt. He studied at Tübingen University, Universidad de Costa Rica, University of Kansas and University of Virginia.
References and further readings
Beck, Thorsten, 2013a. Finance, Growth and Fragility: The Role of Government. CEPR Discussion Paper 9597.
Beck, Thorsten, 2013b. Finance for Development: A Research Agenda. Research Report for ODI.
Beck, Thorsten and Robert Cull, 2014. Banking in Africa, in: Berger, Allen, Phil Molyneux and John Wilson (Eds.): Oxford Handbook of Banking, 2nd edition.
Beck, Thorsten, Samuel Munzele Maimbo, Issa Faye, and Thouraya Triki, 2011. Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Beck, Thorsten and Wolf Wagner, 2013, Supranational Supervision: How Much and for Whom? CEPR Discussion Paper 9546.
Claessens, Stijn and Neeltje van Horen. 2014. Foreign Banks: Trends and Impact. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming.